Abstract
This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 281-307 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 166 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
- General Social Sciences
Keywords
- Content
- Intensional logic
- Possible worlds
- Relativism
- Semantic value
- Semantics