TY - GEN
T1 - Service provider competition and pricing for dynamic spectrum allocation
AU - Acharya, Joydeep
AU - Yates, Roy D.
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We consider dynamic spectrum allocation in the downlink between multiple service providers and users, and develop a model that is applicable for many future scenarios. The service providers set prices for spectrum and transmit data to users, who purchase their spectrum. Each provider transmits at a specific power spectral density which is an indicator of the efficiency of the modulation and coding technology used for transmission. A user application is characterized by a utility function of its received rate which is a function of the allocated spectrum, its link gains to the providers and the providers' transmit power spectral densities. The providers satisfy the spectrum requests of the users by purchasing spectrum from a broker. The providers compete to secure the services of the users and to maximize their profits. Using concepts from microeconomics, we characterize the SP price competition game and show that in the optimal solution each provider has its own customer base. We also characterize the prices charged and profits made by the providers and show how they vary with provider efficiencies and spectrum costs charged by the broker.
AB - We consider dynamic spectrum allocation in the downlink between multiple service providers and users, and develop a model that is applicable for many future scenarios. The service providers set prices for spectrum and transmit data to users, who purchase their spectrum. Each provider transmits at a specific power spectral density which is an indicator of the efficiency of the modulation and coding technology used for transmission. A user application is characterized by a utility function of its received rate which is a function of the allocated spectrum, its link gains to the providers and the providers' transmit power spectral densities. The providers satisfy the spectrum requests of the users by purchasing spectrum from a broker. The providers compete to secure the services of the users and to maximize their profits. Using concepts from microeconomics, we characterize the SP price competition game and show that in the optimal solution each provider has its own customer base. We also characterize the prices charged and profits made by the providers and show how they vary with provider efficiencies and spectrum costs charged by the broker.
KW - Dynamic spectrum allocation
KW - Game theory
KW - Profit maximization
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349997308&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70349997308&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137401
DO - 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137401
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:70349997308
SN - 9781424441778
T3 - Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
SP - 190
EP - 198
BT - Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
T2 - 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Y2 - 13 May 2009 through 15 May 2009
ER -