Side-Channel-Based Code-Execution Monitoring Systems: A Survey

Yi Han, Ioannis Christoudis, Konstantinos I. Diamantaras, Saman Zonouz, Athina Petropulu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Embedded devices, such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices are becoming targets of malware attacks with increasing frequency and catastrophic results. Physical side-channel analysis is one way to monitor a device without accessing its software and, thus, without imposing on its resources. In this article, we present a tutorial-level discussion about detecting anomalies in embedded devices during code execution using side-channel analysis. We provide the necessary background on side-channel analysis and detail the important phases of side-channel-based monitoring in existing approaches. We further provide experimental results of electromagnetic (EM)-emanation and power-consumption side channels. We expect that this article will enable signal processing researchers to better understand the issues involved in extracting side-channel signals, determine how these signals are related to the code, and leverage them for air-gapped intrusion detection. We hope that this understanding will inspire new research on side-channel modeling and characterization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number8653533
Pages (from-to)22-35
Number of pages14
JournalIEEE Signal Processing Magazine
Volume36
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2019
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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