Smart routing in smart grids

S. Rasoul Etesami, Walid Saad, Narayan Mandayam, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as a repeated noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the 'variance' of the ground load induced by the residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2599-2604
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509028733
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 18 2018
Event56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: Dec 12 2017Dec 15 2017

Publication series

Name2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
Volume2018-January

Other

Other56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period12/12/1712/15/17

Fingerprint

Smart Grid
Electric Vehicle
Electric vehicles
Routing
Grid
Prospect Theory
Game
Price of Anarchy
Repeated Games
Vehicle routing
Traffic Congestion
Non-cooperative Game
Traffic congestion
Electric vehicle
Vehicle Routing Problem
Proliferation
Electricity
Energy Efficient
Waiting Time
Nash Equilibrium

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Rasoul Etesami, S., Saad, W., Mandayam, N., & Vincent Poor, H. (2018). Smart routing in smart grids. In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017 (pp. 2599-2604). (2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017; Vol. 2018-January). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8264036
Rasoul Etesami, S. ; Saad, Walid ; Mandayam, Narayan ; Vincent Poor, H. / Smart routing in smart grids. 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 2599-2604 (2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017).
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abstract = "Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as a repeated noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the 'variance' of the ground load induced by the residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.",
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Rasoul Etesami, S, Saad, W, Mandayam, N & Vincent Poor, H 2018, Smart routing in smart grids. in 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017, vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2599-2604, 56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017, Melbourne, Australia, 12/12/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8264036

Smart routing in smart grids. / Rasoul Etesami, S.; Saad, Walid; Mandayam, Narayan; Vincent Poor, H.

2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 2599-2604 (2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017; Vol. 2018-January).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Rasoul Etesami S, Saad W, Mandayam N, Vincent Poor H. Smart routing in smart grids. In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 2599-2604. (2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8264036