TY - JOUR
T1 - Symposium on Larry Temkin's Rethinking the Good
T2 - Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning: Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning: A Précis
AU - Temkin, Larry S.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.
PY - 2015/8/11
Y1 - 2015/8/11
N2 - This article gives a brief overview of Rethinking the Good, whose impossibility arguments illuminate the difficulty of arriving at a coherent theory of the good. I show that an additive-aggregationist principle is plausible for some comparisons, while an anti-additive-aggregationist principle is plausible for others. Invoking Spectrum Arguments, I show that these principles are incompatible with an empirical premise, and various Axioms of Transitivity. I argue that whether the "all-things-considered better than" relation is transitive is not a matter of language or logic, but the nature of moral ideals. If an Internal Aspects View holds, then many standard assumptions about rationality follow, including the Axioms of Transitivity, but not if an Essentially Comparative View holds. Yet many important ideals are essentially comparative. My results have important implications for the normative significance of economics, and require substantial revision in our understanding of the good, moral ideals, and the nature of practical reasoning.
AB - This article gives a brief overview of Rethinking the Good, whose impossibility arguments illuminate the difficulty of arriving at a coherent theory of the good. I show that an additive-aggregationist principle is plausible for some comparisons, while an anti-additive-aggregationist principle is plausible for others. Invoking Spectrum Arguments, I show that these principles are incompatible with an empirical premise, and various Axioms of Transitivity. I argue that whether the "all-things-considered better than" relation is transitive is not a matter of language or logic, but the nature of moral ideals. If an Internal Aspects View holds, then many standard assumptions about rationality follow, including the Axioms of Transitivity, but not if an Essentially Comparative View holds. Yet many important ideals are essentially comparative. My results have important implications for the normative significance of economics, and require substantial revision in our understanding of the good, moral ideals, and the nature of practical reasoning.
KW - Expected Utility Theory
KW - Spectrum Arguments
KW - Transitivity
KW - aggregation
KW - axiology
KW - ideals
KW - rationality
KW - the Good
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84940972996&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84940972996&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1163/17455243-01204001
DO - 10.1163/17455243-01204001
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84940972996
VL - 12
SP - 363
EP - 392
JO - Journal of Moral Philosophy
JF - Journal of Moral Philosophy
SN - 1740-4681
IS - 4
ER -