The a-theory of time, the b-theory of time, and 'taking tense seriously'

The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name 'taking tense seriously'; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called 'tensed theories of time'). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; pre-sentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an 'eternalist' version of the A-theory collapses into merely 'taking tense seriously' - a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable etemalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth.