The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility

Douglas Husak

doi:10.1007/s11572-008-9065-2

The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility

Douglas Husak

School of Arts and Sciences, Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

30 Scopus citations

Abstract

I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	51-70
Number of pages	20
Journal	Criminal Law and Philosophy
Volume	3
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-008-9065-2
State	Published - 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Philosophy
Law

Keywords

Criminalization
Intentions
Justification and excuse
Permissibility
Proportionality

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10.1007/s11572-008-9065-2

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abstract = "I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal).",

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KW - Justification and excuse

KW - Permissibility

KW - Proportionality

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IS - 1

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The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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