The doctrine of triple effect and why a rational agent need not intend the means to his end: I - Frances M. Kamm

Frances M. Kamm, John Harris

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something 'in order to bring about an effect' as opposed to 'doing something because we will bring about an effect'. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)21-39
Number of pages19
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2000
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

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