TY - JOUR
T1 - The double-edged sword of legitimacy in base-of-the-pyramid markets
AU - Kistruck, Geoffrey M.
AU - Webb, Justin W.
AU - Sutter, Christopher J.
AU - Bailey, Anastasia V.G.
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank the Center for International Business Education and Research at The Ohio State University for their funding of this research. The authors would also like to thank Garry Bruton, Julio de Castro, Ariel Sanmartin Mendez, and participants at a PDW conducted at the 2012 Academy of Management Conference for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2015/5/1
Y1 - 2015/5/1
N2 - As compared to developed countries, a much higher proportion of entrepreneurs within base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) markets operate unregistered businesses. Prior research has suggested that the primary cause of such informal activity in these settings is the general failure of 'weak' institutions to provide sufficient resources to warrant formalization. We attempt to extend such thinking by deconstructing the discrete and inter-related effects of formal business registration on the level of resources obtained by entrepreneurs from financial, labor, and legal institutions within BOP markets. Using a multi-method approach involving 299 entrepreneurs within Guatemala City, our results suggest that being seen as a 'legitimate', registered business can actually lead to both increased resource provision and resource appropriation. More specifically, adhering to the norms and rules prescribed by regulatory institutions within weak legal environments can convey positive signals of stability and profitability that both attract the desired attention from formal institutional actors, as well as unwanted attention from criminals.
AB - As compared to developed countries, a much higher proportion of entrepreneurs within base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) markets operate unregistered businesses. Prior research has suggested that the primary cause of such informal activity in these settings is the general failure of 'weak' institutions to provide sufficient resources to warrant formalization. We attempt to extend such thinking by deconstructing the discrete and inter-related effects of formal business registration on the level of resources obtained by entrepreneurs from financial, labor, and legal institutions within BOP markets. Using a multi-method approach involving 299 entrepreneurs within Guatemala City, our results suggest that being seen as a 'legitimate', registered business can actually lead to both increased resource provision and resource appropriation. More specifically, adhering to the norms and rules prescribed by regulatory institutions within weak legal environments can convey positive signals of stability and profitability that both attract the desired attention from formal institutional actors, as well as unwanted attention from criminals.
KW - Base-of-the-pyramid markets
KW - Crime
KW - Illegitimate orders
KW - Informal economy
KW - Informal entrepreneurship
KW - Informal markets
KW - Institutional heterogeneity
KW - Institutional voids
KW - Legitimacy
KW - Weak institutions
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2014.06.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2014.06.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84925303907
SN - 0883-9026
VL - 30
SP - 436
EP - 451
JO - Journal of Business Venturing
JF - Journal of Business Venturing
IS - 3
ER -