The epistemic force of perceptual experience

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13 Scopus citations


What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that sensory states are individuated by the perceptual capacities employed and that there is an asymmetric dependence between their employment in perception and their employment in hallucination and illusion. Due to this asymmetric dependence, sensory states provide us with evidence.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)87-100
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number1
StatePublished - Aug 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy


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