The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)

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12 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that in the marriage problem the student-optimal algorithm may in fact generate an equilibrium outcome that is college-optimal and student-pessimal in terms of the true preferences even though it is student-optimal and college-pessimal in terms of the submitted preferences. In the college admissions problem, the student-optimal algorithm generates either a matching that is not stable for the true preferences or a matching that is college-optimal and student-pessimal in terms of the true preferences. Thus, our results show that, in the absence of certain match variations, the newly designed student-optimal algorithm adopted by the NRMP since 1998 either may be bias in favor of hospitals in terms of the true preferences or fails to produce a true stable matching.We also discuss when the core is large and when the core is a singleton at a Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)150-164
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume69
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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