The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Sandeep Baliga, Luis C. Corchon, Tomas Sjöström

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we study a situation where the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume (i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions on the planner's out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)15-33
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume77
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 1997
Externally publishedYes

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Economics
Signaling games
Complete information
Nash implementation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Baliga, Sandeep ; Corchon, Luis C. ; Sjöström, Tomas. / The theory of implementation when the planner is a player. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1997 ; Vol. 77, No. 1. pp. 15-33.
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The theory of implementation when the planner is a player. / Baliga, Sandeep; Corchon, Luis C.; Sjöström, Tomas.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 77, No. 1, 01.11.1997, p. 15-33.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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