The underexamined assumptions of the invisible hand: Monetary incentives as policy instruments

Thomas W. Church, Milton Heumann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

To alleviate overcrowding in pretrial detention facilities, the City of New York established a program offering substantial budgetary increments to those district attorneys' offices in the city that reduced the number of long‐term detainee cases. The experience with this program suggests that the inherent assuptions underlying a monetary incentive strategy—the existence of capacity, the avoidability of goal displacement, and the efficacy of financial rewards—need to be carefully examined if implementation is to be successful.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)641-657
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Policy Analysis and Management
Volume8
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1989

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration

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