Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation

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Abstract

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)260-275
Number of pages16
JournalRatio Juris
Volume31
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Law

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