Physical layer secret communication is evaluated by the secrecy rate/capacity, which loosely is the Alice-Bob communication rate minus the Alice-Eve communication rate. Eve’s objective is to reduce the secrecy rate and typically this is accomplished by eavesdropping, but it also can be accomplished by Eve directing interference at Bob, reducing the Alice-Bob channel rate.We examine secret communication from Eve’s perspective, where she can either eavesdrop or jam, but not both simultaneously. There are costs and advantages associated with these two options, and to explore the selection between these two options, we apply a gametheoretical approach. We find the equilibrium strategies for two scenarios: (a) Alice and Eve have to decide the probability for which each can apply On/Off power strategies in choosing between eavesdropping and jamming options, (b) Alice and Eve tune transmission/jamming powers and Eve chooses either a single-level or bi-level mode for interfering with the Alice-Bob communication.We show in the tuned-power scenario that Eve prefers either pure jamming or a mixed strategy over pure eavesdropping. We show the concave dependence of Eve’s payoff on the eavesdropping fading channel gain. Surprisingly, we find that both Eve and Alice- Bob can benefit for a small range of eavesdropping channel gains when Eve switches from pure jamming to a mixed strategy.