Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation

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Abstract

This article looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then any Pareto-efficient social choice function can be implemented if there are at least three agents who play undominated Nash equilibria. The mechanism does not use modulo or integer games, has no bad mixed strategy equilibria, and is "bounded."Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)337-352
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume26
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1999
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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