Abstract
Modern distributed systems tend to be conglomerates of heterogeneous subsystems, which have been designed separately, by different people, with little, if any, knowledge of each other | and which may be governed by different security policies. A single software agent operating within such a system may find itself interacting with, or even belonging to, several subsystems, and thus be subject to several disparate policies. If every such policy is expressed by means of a different formalism and enforced with a different mechanism, the situation can get easily out of hand. To deal with this problem we propose in this paper a security mechanism that can support efficiently, and in a unified manner, a wide range of security models and policies, including: conventional discretionary models that use capabilities or access-control lists, mandatory lattice-based access control models, and the more sophisticated models and policies required for commercial applications. Moreover, under the proposed mechanism, a single agent may be involved in several different modes of interactions that are subject to disparate security policies.
Original language | English (US) |
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State | Published - 1998 |
Event | 7th USENIX Security Symposium - San Antonio, United States Duration: Jan 26 1998 → Jan 29 1998 |
Conference
Conference | 7th USENIX Security Symposium |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | San Antonio |
Period | 1/26/98 → 1/29/98 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Information Systems