Abstract
Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of our firmest and most basic convictions about truth. An account of truth that fails to accommodate either sort of apparent fact is inadequate. The account presented in this essay attempts to avoid this inadequacy by 'deflating' truth for propositions but 'inflating' truth for entities that express propositions, thus drawing from the insights of both deflationists and correspondence theorists.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 69-98 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Mind |
Volume | 106 |
Issue number | 421 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1997 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy