Why I Am Not a Dualist

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


cI argue that dualism does not help assuage the perceived explanatory failure of physicalism. I begin with the claim that a minimally plausible dualism should only postulate a small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and fundamental psychophysical laws: It should systematize the teeming mess of phenomenal properties and psychophysical correlations. I then argue that it is dialectically odd to think that empirical investigation could not possibly reveal a physicalist explanation of consciousness, and yet can reveal this small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and psychophysical laws. I go on to consider a couple of different forms the dualist’s laws could take, and argue that one version makes no progress on the hard problem of consciousness, and the other replaces the hard problem with a different problem that is just as hard.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages24
ISBN (Electronic)9780198845850
StatePublished - Jan 1 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Arts and Humanities


  • consciousness
  • dualism
  • explanation
  • mind
  • physicalism


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