cI argue that dualism does not help assuage the perceived explanatory failure of physicalism. I begin with the claim that a minimally plausible dualism should only postulate a small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and fundamental psychophysical laws: It should systematize the teeming mess of phenomenal properties and psychophysical correlations. I then argue that it is dialectically odd to think that empirical investigation could not possibly reveal a physicalist explanation of consciousness, and yet can reveal this small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and psychophysical laws. I go on to consider a couple of different forms the dualist’s laws could take, and argue that one version makes no progress on the hard problem of consciousness, and the other replaces the hard problem with a different problem that is just as hard.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Number of pages||24|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2021|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Arts and Humanities(all)